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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes exchange rate management in a simple overlapping
generations model. This framework is used to evaluate alternative policies
in terms of their implications for the welfare of individuals in the economy.
The analysis identifies two objectives of monetarypolicy,providing a
desirable store of value and collecting seigniorage. Whenthechiefconcern
is to provide a desirable store of value (as when the monetaryauthority's
major constituency consists of the asset holders of the economy), a policy
of fixing the exchange rate does better when shocks are primarily of domestic
origin while floating becomes more desirable when foreign shocks predominate.
Whenseigniorage concerns are paramount (aswhenthe authority's constituency
is the young generation) flexible rates dobetter.When seigniorage concerns
are paramountand when the monetary authority cannot establish a reputation
for conducting monetary policy in a way that makes the currency a desirable
store of value, a national currency may not be viableinthe absence of








The designofmonetary policy and exchange rate management is a topic
that hasreceivedconsiderable attention in the last five years. Papers by
BUiter(1979), Turnovsky (1983), Buiter and Eaton (1980), Eaton andTurnovsky
(1980) and Frenkel and Aizenman (1982) are examples of models that consider
the optimality of alternative stabilization rules. The models used to
evaluate alternative monetary andexchangerate policies and to derive
optimal policies suffer fromfourdeficiencies that this paper attempts to
address.
First, modelsare constructed on the basis of a number of aggregate macro-
economicrelationships that are not derived from underlying preferences and
technologies. Their usefulness for policy evaluation is therefore questionable
for the reason given by Lucas (1976): changes in policy mayleadto changes in
these aggregate relationships. Output supply and asset demands are examples of
functional relationships that may be sensitive to policy changes.
Second, po1cy evaluation is based upon ad hoc objective functions of the
government rather than upon a comparison of the welfare of individuals in the
economy under alternative policies. Assuming that the government is responsive
to the welfare of its citizens its policy objectives should derive from the
preferences of individuals in the economy. When individual objective functions
are specified alternative policies can then be evaluated in terms of their
effects on individuals' utilities.
Third, discussion of optimal monetary policy in open economies has typically
ignored the role of national monies in generating seigniorage for their govern-
ments. Fischer (1982) has recently discussed seigniorage as an objective of2
monetarypolicy but provides no formal analysis. In fact, in some countries
seigniorage constitutes a major source of revenue, possibly because it con-
stitutes the administratively least expensive and least distortionary form
oftaxation.
Fourth, optimal policies are typically derived from the class of closed
-looppolicies. As Kydland and Prescott (1977) have emphasized, such policies
may not be time consistent. For many of the models discussed above the
optimal closed loop and optimal feedback policies coincide.' Once seigniorage
considerations are introduced, however, they diverge.
This paper develops a model of an open economy derivative of the Samuelson
(1958) pure consumption loan model.2 Individuals have available to them as a
store of value aforeign currency which depreciates in value at a stochastic
ratethat is exogenous to the economy under consideration. The population
growth rate of this economy is also an exogenous stochastic process.
The government of this economy has the ability to provide its owncurrency
as a store of value. Individuals choose their first period consumption and
•
allocate their savings between the two currencies to maximize the expected
utility of consumption over two periods. There is no individual bequest motive.
New money issue is used to finance government expenditure which is assumed to
benefit only the younger generation. It is assumed that foreigners do not
hold the domestic currency, possibly because of exchange controls or the fear
ofexchange controls in the future. Otherwise the exchange rate would be
indeterminate, as demonstrated byKareken and Wallace (198l).
Bringingthe economy toward the o1den Rule andgeneratingseigniorage
constitute twomajor goalsof monetary policy. Providing a relatively riakiess
store of value is an additional goal. The objectives of monetarypolicyto
providea desirable store of value and togenerate revenue for public expendi-
ture are in sharp conflict in the short runbutmaybemore compatible in the
longrun.3
When the primary objective of themonetaryauthorityis to provide a
-
desirablestore of value, one insight of the previous literaturereemerges:
a policy of predetermining the exchange rate each period tendsto yield
higher welfare when the foreign price level is stable relativeto domestic
outputand conversely. A policy of having no nationalcurrency at all,
relying solely upon the foreign currency as a store ofvalue, can in some
circumstancesdominate a policy of having a currency fixed in value in
terms of the foreign currency or freely floating against it. Whenthe
primaryfunctionof the monetary authority is to generateseigniorage, however,
a policy of pure floating always dominates a fixed exchange ratepolicy or a
policy of having no national currency.
When seigniorage considerations are present, a government that attempts
to maximize the welfare only of the current younggeneration cannot sustain
a currency. The only time consistent policy leads to a nonmonetary economy.
Introducing the expected utility of future generations as a public good can
reverse this result, however. Alternatively, when earning seigniorage is not
an objective3' time consistent policy can correspond to the optimal
closed loop policy.4
Section 2 derives the optimal savings and portfolio behavior of each
atomistic individual in the economy under consideration. Section 3 imbeds
this behavior in a simple, aggregate model to derive the behavior of the
domestic price level and the exchange rate as functions of exogenous vari-
ables and policy parameters. The expected welfare of each generation in a
nonmonetary economy is derived In section 4, and is compared with expected
welfare under fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes for a monetary economy.
Section 5 considers optimal feedback policies under alternative social welfare
and individual utility functions. Section 6 discusses the role of reputation
as a means of enforcing a monetary economy and the optimal closed loop policy.
Some concluding remarks appear in section 7.4
2. OptimalConsumptionand Portfolio Behavior
Consider an economy of the Saxnuelson (1958) pure consumption loan
variety. Individuals live two periods, earning an amount Y in the first
period of their lives and nothing in the second period. An individual
i entering the labor force in period t seeks to maximize a utility function
of the form:
log + 8 log C0+1+ w Ct (2.1)
where C1 denotes i's consumption in the working period, CO+ in the retire-
ment period, and G denotes per worker government spending in the working
period. Individuals are assumed not to derive utility from government spend—
'ingintheir retirement period. The parameter w indicates the weight placed
on government spending relative to private consumption.
Individuals have available to them as stores of value a domestic money
and a foreign money. There is a single traded good, the price of which, in
period t, is P in terms of domestic money and in terms of foreign money.
Exact purchasing power parity (PPP) obtains so that
EP
(2.2)
where Et denotes the domestic currency price of foreign currency. The country
under consideration is small in the sense that domestic actions do not affect
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Rere 11* is a constant and u a Gaussian white noise process with variance
The individual also takes as given the domestic price level P which5




Here 11 is a constant and u a Gaussian white noise process with variance a 2
t p
Thenextsection derives this process for the domestic price from the under-
lying macroeconomic equilibrium of the economy.
No voluntary intergenerational transfers take place. The two monies
provide the only assets to transfer income from the working period to the
iy retirement period. During the working period individual ithuschooses C
and divides his wealth between the two monies to maximize expected lifetime








where M and Mt denote individual i's holdings of domestic and foreign
money respectively. Neither neycanbe held in negative
iy i i amounts. Thus Y — and 1 —Atmust be nonnegative.




(' —A)(p/p+ j)]( — c) (2.7)6
* 2 2 Byassuming that the parameters 11, II ,aand are sufficiently small





Combining (2.8) and (2.9) with the PPP relationship (2.2) gives
** * e
E/E + =1+ II —ll +uj u1 1 + It —II÷u1 (2.10)
liere uis the implied error term in the change in E .Asecond—order Taylor
series approximation of the expectation of log C° around log (Y —
using(2.8),(2.9) and (2.10) is
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This section has characterized the optimal consumption and portfolio
behavior of a single individual facing a given level of government spending
and distributions of the foreign and domestic price levels and the exchange
rate. The next section derives the level of government spending and the
behavior of the domestic price level and exchange rate from aggregate
characteristics of the economy and from government policy.
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3. The Aggregate Economy
Since all individuals earn the same income and face the same distri-





while the aggregate consumption of the working generation C is
C
(3.2)
where Lt is the number of workers entering the labor force in period t.
The number of workers entering the labor force in period t is (1 +




Heren is a constant andua Gaussian white noise process with variancea2.
t n
n
Assumethat Ut andu are uncorrelated. -




•New monetary issue is used to finance government spending. There are no
other sources of government revenue5 Thus
Mt —Mt—1•mMt —1[(1 + Lb]'
• (35) tPLtp_
thus nstitutes total seignidrage gleaned in period t.
Following much of the previous literature on exchange rate intervention
this model assumes that the only contemporaneous variable that the government
observes is the exchange rate. (See, e.g. (Buiter (1979), Turnovsky (1983),
Buiter and Eaton (1980), Eaton and Turnovsky (1980), Frenkel and Aizenman (19E2)).
On the basis of information available at the end of the previous period the
government sets a monetary growth rate g that is subject to revision in
response to new information embodied in the exchange rate. The actual money
growth rate is therefore
M e g + au
(3.6)
where u, recall, is the unanticipated component of the exchange rate anda
a policy parameter. Setting a =0corresponds to a regime of pure floating
whilethe exchange rate is fixed within theperiod(i.e.,nonatochastic) when
—— . Itis assumed that g is bounded from below byzero; theexpected
level of government spending cannot be negative.10




Taking the first difference of the logarithm of this expression, assuming








• Assuming that individuals know the parameters of the actual inflation
process,equations (3.8) and (3.9) imply that
(3.10)
• — (u+ atu*) (— a) (3.11)
—(u+ u*) (1 —a) (3.12)
Therefore,as of period t,
+ a+1a*2)(1—a+ (3.13)
•• 2&+a2) (1—a+ i)_2
—2
Uep(% +a+ia*) (l_a+i)
AssumingthatU, ii,g,c21 and are sufficiently small to treat the
-




(1 —aY2(ci + a)] (3.14)
where W(1 —) Y,per capita savings.11
Substituting equations (3.10), (3.13) and (3.14) into equation(2.14)
givesan expression for the expected utility of a worker ingeneration t
aaofperiod t—iasa functionof exogenous and policyparameters.
Thenext section derives policy parameters that maximize theexpected
utility of the average generation. Sections 5 and 6 considerthe dynamic
consistency of these policies.
/12.
4.The Benefits of a National Moneyunder Fixedand Flexible Exchange Rates
This sections considers a monetary response that is repeated each




toderive policies that maximize the expected utility of the average generation.
When policy is of the form (4.1) and (4.2) the model under consideration
is stationary.
The shareofforeign currency in total money balances is, from (2.13),
(3.10), and (3.13).




Theexpected utilityof a member of any generation, where the expectation is
taken as of any period before entry into the labor force, is, therefore
Up + (1 + — [fl*+ (1 —A)(gM —n fl*)]
22 22 — ((1—
°n+(a —A)a*] (1 —a)'72
+ w(1- X)W[gM -a2(l-a)2(a2+ 2)] (4.5)
The values cfgMand a thatmaximize thisexpression, incorporating A as





response. Analytic solutions for the general case were not obtained.
It is nevertheless useful to consider instead three special cases:
the non—monetary economy, the monetary economy with fixed exchange rates
within the period, and a monetary economy with perfectly flexible rates
4.1 A Nonmonetary Economy
From expression (4.3) observe that if
>n+ 11* + a/(l —a) (4.6)
then A =1,i.e., domestic currency is not held at all. Seigniorage from





When a =—individuals will hold only domestic currency if g —n<II*
endonlyforeign currency if gM —n>II*The econd case yields the noninonetary
economy. If gM.n=u* individuals are indifferent between the two currencies.
For concreteness, assume that A =0In this case. WhengM<n+ 11*, then,
expected utility is given by
UPp+ (I + —gM—n)—1/2cy2+ W[gM —(2+ a2)] (4.8)
andwhengM >n+ 11* by uN. Therefore if wW>l it is optimal to set gM =j* +
while if wJ<l, to set g =0.In the first case expected utility is
p +l —fl*-a2/2+ W(fl* + n — + a2)] (4.8')
while in the second it is
UP'— p+ (1 + ) + n —a2/2
—wW(a2+cT2) (4.8")14
Comparing (4.8') and(4.8")with (4.7), expected utility in a nonmonetary
economy, note that a nonmonetary economy dominates a monetary economy with fixed
exchangeratesif and only if
1.wW>l and
2+ > + (4.9)
or
2.wW<land
2 2 wW(a + a) >n*+ n
The only cost to establishing a currency with ixed rates relative to a no
currency situation is the variability in seign.orage. This cost increases
with the variance of the foreign price leveland the domestic growth rate.
The benefit is the ability either to earn seigniorage on domestic currency or
else to establish the Golden Rule interest rate. Either bnef it increases with
the term 11* + n, or the difference between the world interest rate (_fl*) and the
domestic growth rate.
4.3FlexibleExchange Rates
Whena =0individuals will hold foreign currency in proportion
•Amin1maxro,_fl*)+ci iT (4.10)
2 2j'J • t. aa p






noforeign currency will be held.15
Assuminganinterior solution for A, average utility is
+ (l+8)— (gM_s) 1/2a2
(gM_n_n*+a2)2
+ +wWg
a a 2a +a)
The optimal monetary growth rate maximizes expression (4.13) subject to the
M
constraints (4.11), (4.12) and gO. The second—order condition for a
maximum is satisfied, however, if and only if wW>l.
In view of this complication it is considerably simpler to focus on two
particular special cases, one in which seigniorage effects are negligible (W=O),
and one in which they are paramount (wW=oo).Eachis treated in turn.
4.3.1 Absence of Seignioage Effects
When no social welfare derives from seigniorage maximumaverageutility




2 2 In the first case average utility is
n
p + (1 + + n -1/2a2 (4.13')
while in the second it is
2(a2_n_fl*)2
p + (1 + 8) + n —1/2a + 2 (4.13")
2(a+a*) U p
Comparing expressions (4.13') and (4.13") with (4.7) note thatamonetary economy
with pure floating dominates a nonmonetary economy when r + fl* and a*2 are
large relative to a2.16
Thegreaterthe domestic growth rate relative to the foreign inflation rate
the higher is the increase in the rate of return from establishing a domestic
currency. Whena*2is large relative to o the return on domestic money
under floating rates will be relatively less risky.
The desirability of fixing the exchange rate or allowing it to float
canbedetermined by comparing expressions (4.13') and (4.13") with
expression (4.8") evaluated at w =0.The condition for -fIxed rates to
dominate is:







(n+ JI*)2 —2a2(n+ *) + a <0
When a




a2 the choice isa matter of indifference if n + but if U*2
a + U <a flexible rates are preferable. The reason is that, in this second
case, the portfclio is diversified under flexible rates, and flexible rates
allow a reducti(,n in risk.6
4. 3.2 Dominance of Seigniorage Effects
--
Toanalysethesituation in which earning seigniorage is of paramount
concern set.Fromexpression (4.13) observe that seigniorage is at a
maximumwhen•
gM(n+ fl+ a)/2 (4.15)
if X>:Oatthis value which requires, in turn, that
n + —a2)/2<2 (4.16)17
In this case earnings from seigniorage, denoted S, are
*22
(n+fl +a)p W (4.17)
.4(a2+a*2) U p
0





2 S(n+fl— a)W (4.19)
Since both (4.17) and (4.19) are positive, while in a nonmonetary economy
seigniorage is zero, when seigniorage dominates the welfare function a monetary
policy with flexible rates always yields higher expected utilitythan a non--
monetary economy.
Under fixed rates seigniorage earnings are stochastic because of theneed
to intervene in the foreign exchange market to stabilize the currency.The
appropriate comparison,then, is between expected seigniorageunder
the two regimes. Normalizing (4.8) by dividing through by Lhnotethat maxirnum
expected seigniorage under fixed rates as w goes to infinityis
E(S)[fl* + —(2÷a2)]W (4.20)
By comparing (4.20) with (4.17) and (4.19) it canbe shown that maximum
expectedseigniorage is necessarily higher under perfectlyflexible exchange
rates. When rates are perfectly flexible disturbancesin the foreign price
level affect neither the domestic price level nor the amountof money creation.
They consequently do not affect real per capita seigniorage.Disturbances in
the domestic population growth rate create domestic pricelevel disturbances
in the opposite direction. The two cancel each other tothe point where, as a18
first—order approximation,real seignorage capita is non—stochastic.
When exchange rates are fixed, however, variation in the domestic price
level and population growth rate are no longer perfectly negatively
correlated. As a consequence of Jensen's inequality, expected real
seignorage per capita is lower. This effect is not offset by the fact
thatunderfixed rates more money can be created, on average, without
leading to substitution into the foreign currency. Under fixed rates
M
A0 whenever g <n÷11* whileunder flexible rates A =0requires
gM<n+n*_2.19
5. OptimalFeedbackand Closed Loop Policies
The last section compared expected utility in a situation in whichthe
monetaryauthoritypegs the exchange rate each period with one in which it
sets the money supply independently of theexchange rate. It was assumed that
the monetary authority could precommit itself to amonetary response that
maximizes the expected utility of each generation.
The monetary authority may,however,respond only to the wishes of
generations present at the time the monetary policy is implemented. At this
pointthe money holdings of the old generation are a bygone, while the demand
for money of the young geieration dependsupon its expectations of policy in a
later period. If current policy has no effect on expectations of futurepolicy
the monetary authority will establish a level ofmonetary growth each period
taking as given monetary policies in other periods andexisting asset
holdings.
In period t, then, the authority selects and a to maximizea weighted
average of the old and young generation.' utilities. Let a denote theweight
assigned to the young generation's utility and 1—a the weight to the old
generation's utility.
The component of the expected utility of che old. generation that isa
function of policyin period tis
+ (1 —A—) — —
—[(1—- a2 +(a -A — 1)22] (1 —a)2/2
(5.1)




A time consistent policy is a choice of g anda that maximizes
csU+(l—ct)U. -
Whenseigniorage earnings do not affect utility (=0) the young
generation is unaffected by current policy. Situations in which séigniorage
effects are absent (w = 0) and in which the old generation dominates the
social welfare function (a = 0) thus imply equivalent welfare criteria.
Similarly, equivalent welfare criteria emerge when seigniorage effects are
paramount (ô=co) and when the young generation dominates the social
welfare function (a = 1).
One result of this section is that when the young generation dominates
•the social welfare function or when seigniorage dominates the individual
utility function (i.e., when a = 1 when °Fw= co) then time consistent (or
optimal feedback) policy cannot sustain a monetary economy. The consequent
equilibrium is in general inferior to the optimum that would emerge if the
monetary authority could precommit itself to an alternative policy (i.e.,
to choosing the optimal closed loop policy). A second result is that when
the old generation dominates the social welfare function or when seigniorage
does not appear in the individual utility function (i.e., when a = 0 or u = 0)
then time consistent policy may also yield a nonmonetary economy or it may yield
the optimal closed loop policy.
5,]. Dominance of Seigniorage Effects or Young Generation Dominant
For the case in which a = 1 or w = this result is straightforward.
is maximized when g =and a = 0. Given ,thehigher the monetary
growth rate the more revenue from seigniorage while exchange market intervet.tion
reduces expected seigniorage revenue.
When the policy parameters assume these values the rate of return on
domestic currency is ....minus Infinity. Wealthholderg, anticipating in the previous21
period that these policies will be pursued,will set At — 1. Hence,
in a rational expectations equilibrium,no seigniorage is collected. The
economy degenerates to a nonmonetary economy with expected utility per
generation uNgivenby expression (4.7).
5.2Absenceof Seigniorage Effect or Old Generation Dominant
Somewhatmoresurprisingly, this same result can emerge when a =1or
0 •




Individuals, anticipating that this policy will be implemented in period twhen
selecting their portfolios in period t —1,will, from equation (4.3), choose
—1mm {[




Thisequation has as a solution, At—.= 1,in which casea =1.If n ÷w*>0,
however, an additional solution is A—1
—0,in which case a ——
Thefirst equilibrium, once again, constitutes a degeneration to a non—
monetary equilibrium with expected average utility U1. The second implies an
expected average utility.
U + (1 + + n —c72a2(c12
+ 2)_l/2






alsoconstitutesan optimal closed loop policy when seigniorage effects ar3
absent (c0). To see this observe that the derivative of expected average
utility, with respect to a, evaluated at the point gM =o,a——a2/a,22
is, from expression (4.5),
—— (n+ fl*) (5.8)
Since at this point A =0, 0. Hence the first—order condition for a time
consistent policy also corresponds to the first—order condition for an optimal
policy when w =0.Since the second—order conditions for a maximum are satisfied,
thistime consistentequilibrium corresponds to the equilibrium that emerges
vhen w0 andtheoptimal closed loop policy is pursued.
An intuitive explanation for the optimality of this equilibrium is that the
larger the share of domestic currency in portfolios, the closer are the expected
domestic interest rate facing consumers and the expected growth rate. A lower value of
A thus brings the economy closer to the Golden Rule, thereby raising welfare.
Theoptimalvalue of a should therefore be chosen to minimize A. In fact,
when policy takes the form of (5.6) and (5.7), A =0,its minimum possible
value. Optimal exchange rate management by th' monetary authority thus provides
a perfect substitute for currency diversification by private individuals as a
meansofminimizing risk. In other words, when the exchange rate is managed
optimally private individuals have no incentivct to hold foreign currency to.
reduce risk. The incentive that the monetary ruthorities have to minimize the
risk associated with domestic currency each period leads them to stabilize the
exchange rate in an optimal way.
5.3Extensionto the General Case
Theconclusionsof sections 5.1 and 5.2 suggest some results that would
emerge if a and w assume intermediate values.
First,forvalues of ciandw sufficiently low, a monetary economy can be
sustained by time consistent policies. Second, the level of monetary growth
will be higher and the amount of intervention lower than in the
casewherect — o Thereason is that to earn seigniorage it is necessary 1o23
Bet gM >•Reducing the amountofintervention, will also raise
expected revenue from seigniorage.24
6. The Role of Reputation in Enforcinga Monetary Economy
A conclusion of the previous section is that whenearning seigniorage
is the predominant concern of the monetary authority,or that when the
utility of the young generation dominates the social welfarefunction,
then a time consistent policy cannot sustaina monetary equilibrium. It
wasassumedthat the only objective of the monetary authority isto maximize
aweighted average of the expected utilities of generationscurrently present.
An alternative objective is to maximize a weightedaverage of the expected
utilities of current and all future generations. Areason for the monetary
authority to take into account the welfare of future generations is thattheir
welfare constitutes a public good to currentgenerations, i.e., the utility of
future generations as a group affects the welfare of thecurrent generations,
but no atomistic member of •a current generation hasan incentive to provide
a bequest to any member of the subsequent generation. In'this context the
monetary authority's incentive to maintain the reputation of itscurrency to
allow future generations to earn seigniorage can lead to the timeconsistency
of a monetary economy.
Let the expected utility from seigniorage of a generation bornat time t
be given by
• - - a(l-a)2(a2 + a)J,} (6.1)
Anupperbound U is placed on the welfare that can be generated fromseigniorage
to insure boundedness of the overall objective function.
Let the objective function of the monetary authorityat time t be
V—E U O<<l 2 t .t—t —25
where6constitutes a discount factor. Taking future policies gM, a asiven,




Denotethis policy as the optimal one—period policy.
At some initial period to the monetary authority announces the policy
response henceforth, denoted by the parainers ä, t >t.If the monetary
authority deviates from the policy it announces in some period t,individuals
will anticipate that for Vt>t, gM =g,a —0,i.e., that the optimal one
period policy will be pursued. Let U be sufficiently high to imply
— * 2
U/W >ii ÷Ii+ (6.4)
which,from expression (4.3), insures that when individuals anticipate the optimal
one—period policy in period ttheywill select A— l i.e., hold no domestic
currency.
Ifthe authority deviates from its announced policy in period t,assuming
thatA —
<l,itcan attain a level of its objective functionU in that period
endzero subsequcntly, since henceforth A =1.The economy degenerates to a
nonmonetary economy. Thus the value of deviating from the announcement in any
periodt is simply U.
By sticking with its announced policy in period t,assumingthat this policy
was anticipated in period t—landthat the announced policy will be adhered to













The time consistenyof the announced policy reauires thatW >iVt>to;Chat
is, the value to the monetary authority of adhering to the announced policy,
and thereby maintaining the expectation that it will continue to adhereto
this policy,must exceed the maximum value of reverting to the optimalone—period
policy.
S
Theoptimalcrediblepolicy is a choice of , inthe initial period
• that maximizes Wa subject to the constraints Wa>ut > C.ForC >t o C —o
the first—order conditions for a maximum ofW are the same as those for
the unconstrained optimal closed loop policy. Since these first—order con-
ditions are independent of t they imply a stationary solution for t >to.
Thus let g, =for t t. Denote
maxW, t>to (6.7)
ifii>(1—6)Uthenthe ptima1crediblepolicy in period C and the uncon—
strained pimalclosedpçp policy coincide. If W< (1—6)Utheunconstrained
optimal closed loop policy is not sustainableby a time consistent policy. For
t> tothe economy degenerates toa nonmonetari, economy.
S27
7. Conclusion
This paper has analysed exchange rate management in avery simple
overlapping generations model. The purpose has been to evaluate monetary
policy in an open economy on the basis of its implications for the welfare
of individuals in the economy. While this paper has used a micro—
economic framework for analysing monetary policy, it has done so at the
expense of omitting a number of important features of open economies that
have received attention elsewhere. For example, in this model government
debt provides th2 oaiy store of value. There is no productive capital and
no distinction Letween assets that are held as stores of value and for
transactions purposes. The implications of policy for output and employment
are not considered. The lack of a consensus about the microeconomic causes
of these phenomena makestheirincorporation into an analysis of this sort
difficult.
-
Theanalys:.s in this paper identifies two objectives of monetary policy:
to provide a desirable store of value, i.e., one with a high and stable rate
of return, and to collect seigniorage. Despite the difference inapproach
betweenthis and other studies some similar results emerge.7 In particular.
a policy of pure floating is likely to be more desirable when the foreign price
•level is highly variable relative to domestic outputand converssly. In
addition,the benefits of having a national currency at alldiminish when the
foreigninflation rate islowand stable.
While having a national currency may be desirable from a national welfare
perspective, tine consistent policy on the part of the monetary authority may
be unable to sustain a currency. This result is most likely to emerge when the
primary concern of the monetary authority is the extraction of seigniorage (as
when itsmajorconstituency is the younggeneration) and when It is unable to28
develop a reputation (as when the monetary authority is not perceivedas a
continuous, infinitely—lived organization). The fact that seignioragepro-
vides a major source of revenue in some countriessuggests why these are also
countries that must institute exchange controls: the policepower of the state
is used to maintain the viability of domesticcurrency faced with competition
from foreign currencies. When seigniorage provides the leastdistortionary
source of government revenue at the margin, such policies may be optimal.
This paper has considered government liabilities that take the form of
currency. Introducing a coupon on this liability would not affect the analysis.
Hence the model applies to government borrowing generally rather thansimply to
monetary issue.Introducing a distinction betweenmonetaryand non—monetary
debt would require introducing a transactions motive for holdingmoney. This
aspect of the microfoundatjons of exchange rate management has been explored
by Stockinan(1980)and Helpman (1981). An integration of 'the portfolio con-
siderations examinedhere and the transactions motives treated in this other
literature constitutes an important topic for future research.29
FOOTNOTES
1. See Kydland (1977) for a discussion of the distinction between
closed loop and feedback policies. See Calvo (1978) for
a discussion of optimal and time consistent monetary policies
in a non—stochastic closed economy context.
2. Exchange rate policy has also been examined in an overlapping
generations context by Lapan and Enders (1979, 1980), Aizenman
(1981) and Hsieh (1982). These papers assume that private
individuals are unable to hold foreign assets. Exchange
rate intervention therefore creates a scope for capital mobility
that otherwise would be absent. A comparison between exchange
rate regimes therefore, implicitly, involves a comparison
of different degrees of capital mobility. In contrast this
paper assumes that private individuals can hold foreign assets.
Hence the degree of capital mobility is fixed across regimes.
Heipman and Razin (1979) provide a discussion of this point.
3. Lapan and Endérs (1983) and Nickelsburg (1981) show, in general how
actualand potential capital controls can lead to a unique
exchange rate.
4. This paper considers monetary policy ma single small open
economy in which collection of seiiorage isa pOlicy goal.
Buiter and Eaton (1983) have analysed the interaction of
the monetary policies of' several countries in a deterministic
overlapping generations context, also focussing on the sei1iorage
issue.
5. An equivalent assumption for the purposes of this analysis
is that other revenue sources are inelastically supplied
in some amount T and that the utility function (2.1) is of
the form:
log C +8log +w(+ Gt)
Alternatively, the utility function could incorporate deadweight
losses from other sources of tax revenue as well as the benefits
from government spending.
6. The optimal value of the intervention parameter a, when seigniorage
considerations are absent, is derived in Section 5 below.
7.Inprinciple, seigniorage considerations could be introduced
into a much wider class of macroeconomic models to derive
optiinai. policy rules. A number of' conclusions derived in
the simple overlapping generations model used here are likely
to emerge in more general models.30
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